For the last few decades, researchers have tried to explain the way companies choose their capital structure and, even more challenging, to find the optimal financial structure, the one which minimizes capital cost and maximizes firm’s value. One of the theories proposed to explain the financing choice of companies is based on the agency costs. This theory suggests that financing decisions are influenced by the companies’ efforts to mitigate the conflicts of interest that exist between the different stakeholders of the company (the conflict between managers and shareholders and the conflict between shareholders and debtholders). According to this theory, one way of mitigating the conflict between managers and shareholders is by increasing debt, but this emphasizes the conflict between shareholders and debtholders, leading to the increase of capital cost. In this context, we seek to analyze the impact of corporate governance provisions on capital structure. The recent financial scandals led to attempts to strengthen the corporate governance. This clearly interferes in the managers-shareholders conflict. But how does this affect capital structure?