Under current circumstances of the financial crisis, many fingers have been pointing toward fair value accounting for financial instruments as being at the root of this situation that supposable “got out of hand”. We argue that it is just another case of shooting the messenger, by proving where things really went wrong, and who can indeed be considered responsible within the formed vicious cycle. This is done by analyzing on one hand the financial mechanism of derivatives involved within the credit crisis, namely collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and on the other, the foresights of the American accounting referential, while considering involved parties. The results show that fair value accounting is nothing but a ‘scapegoat’, while the ones who are now asking a restriction in the scope of fair value accounting should take more responsibility for their actions. An objective point of view implies making a clearer distinction between accounting and prudential concerns. Previous cases invoking valuation of financial instruments, such as Enron, are also discussed. Still, the conclusion is that not only fair value accounting cannot be blamed, but also it could have helped reducing the crisis’ proportion, if used properly.